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Times of crisis are not usually associated with deep 
reflection. Yet, at a moment when it is assailed by a range 
of concrete problems – from managing migration to a 
possible Brexit − the European Union (EU) is finalizing a 
wide-ranging ‘EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security 
Policy’. As it was for its predecessor, the 2003 European 
Security Strategy, the very process of drafting such a 
document is a welcome exercise in strategic cooperation. 
However, too much consensus can risk dilution, and the 
EU should aim for a strong guiding document. In order to 
achieve this, three strategic dilemmas at the heart of 
Europe’s foreign policy personality need to be untangled. 
 
Borders − ‘fortress’ or open Europe? 
 
The first strategic dilemma is the direction of European 
focus and ambition. To some extent the inward focus of 
recent years has been understandable. After the optimism 
of the Lisbon Treaty, Europe was rocked by financial crisis, 
social uncertainty, and (more recently) terrorist threats. It 
has spent a considerable amount of time and political 
capital addressing these issues, often to the detriment of 
global engagement. Notwithstanding efforts to boost 
diplomatic activity − the establishment of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and its involvement in the 
Iranian nuclear negotiations, for one − Europe's presence 
in the world continues to be compromised. In his last State 
of the Union address, President Barack Obama mentioned 
Europe just once; a telling sign not only of US priorities but 
also of European visibility. 
 
Of course, foreign policy does begin at home. According to 
US political strategist William Martel, the first rule of global 
power is to ensure ‘strong domestic foundations including 
fiscal discipline, functioning domestic infrastructure, a 
strong education, and a culture that encourages 
innovation’. Similarly, to promote values abroad one must 
practice them impeccably at home, or risk losing credibility. 
This is all the more important for Europe, a normative actor 
historically focused on ‘leading by example’ rather than 
imposing on the world stage. As some member states 
scramble to revoke foundational agreements such as 
Schengen and others slide towards illiberal tendencies, 
they risk eroding the very foundations which have enabled 
the EU to develop a global identity in the first place. 
Executive Summary 
> For the first time since 2003, the EU is set to 
launch a Global Strategy. To achieve a strong 
and coherent document, several strategic 
dilemmas need untangling. 
> Under pressure from nationalism and 
migratory flows, Europe must avoid turning 
inwards and building new walls, and rather 
face the world with renewed openness and 
confidence. 
> In its neighbourhood the EU is surrounded by 
conflict and competing narratives. In dealing 
with this reality, it must finally achieve a clear 
balance between interests and values. 
> In a competitive world, the EU should neither 
abandon its commitment to a rules-based 
multilateral system nor fear using its economic 
muscle to make a real difference. 
> Ultimately, the Global Strategy should avoid 
becoming too much like either a long 
compendium or a toothless constitution − it 
needs to outline clear, concise and concrete 
objectives. 
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But if getting one’s house in order is an imperative first 
step, a blinkered focus can also lead to problems. The first 
is the danger of becoming overly fixated on the perfection 
of internal processes to the detriment of external vision 
and proactive engagement. Values are definable, but in a 
complex world institutions and processes need to be 
increasingly flexible. And despite constant predictions of 
demise, the web of institutions which run the European 
structure have ‘muddled through’ and have even proved 
surprisingly resilient and adaptable in some difficult 
situations. Ever-shifting conditions and crises mean that 
European rules will never be perfect, and it would be 
misguided to spend undue energy on their endless critique 
and revision while the world moves ahead obliviously. 
 
The second danger is allowing this inward focus on 
processes to influence the open values which helped shape 
the continent. If the 1980s warned of the risk of an 
economic ‘fortress Europe’, the current threat is more of 
an actual ‘fortress Europe’ in light of the migration crisis. 
Rhetoric routinely calls for the closing and tightening of 
borders, both external and within the EU itself. This 
erection of walls runs counter to both European values and 
interests of a liberal international order. If irregular 
migration is clearly a significant problem for internal 
institutions and social stability, the solution does not lie 
(only) in tougher border patrols; it involves a more 
muscular diplomatic, economic and cultural engagement 
with the sources of instability themselves.  
 
Ultimately, any consolidation of home ‘values’, processes, 
institutions or societies is a necessary step. But the EU 
needs to be wary that this does not happen at the expense 
of external vigilance and engagement. No nation or 
organization is ever perfect − rather it is the prospect of 
improvement that spurs it ever forward. Europe can 
neither revert to a collection of nation-states nor forcibly 
impose the integrative vision of its founding fathers. 
Rather, it needs to ensure that its ambition of refinement 
is used constructively, rather than counter-productively 
rowing against the current into the past. 
 
The neighbourhood − values or interests? 
 
Despite global interconnectedness, geography remains a 
fundamental driver of international relations. The very 
foundations and evolution of the EU lend currency to this 
logic. From the economic interlinking of France and 
Germany in the 1950s to the enlargement and later the 
neighbourhood policies, Europe has progressively 
expanded in concentric waves of regulatory and normative 
influence over time. 
 
However, in 2016, it is obvious that the current turmoil to 
the East and South means that this expansionary project of 
EU governance has reached a limit. Around the 
Mediterranean, many state structures have either 
collapsed or been re-focused around authoritarian 
tendencies, with both scenarios playing out badly for 
European security and values. Democracy has stagnated; 
so have economic links between Europe and North Africa; 
and the refugee and migrant influx, especially from Syria, is 
testament to both a humanitarian and security quagmire in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, to the East, 
hopes of exporting European norms to Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova and the Eurasian Economic Union have been 
blocked, sometimes with force, by Russia. 
 
The reasons for the impasse are numerous and two-sided. 
From the implementation and aspiration side, the ENP put 
the technical cart before the political horse; neglecting the 
cultural singularities of the Arab world, it consistently 
favoured regulatory and elite-driven policies which had 
previously worked in Eastern Europe. When the uprisings 
of 2011 exploded, heralding an unprecedented shift on the 
‘demand’ side, such an approach left Europe 
understandably flat-footed. And even after the Arab 
Spring, although the EU made an admirable effort to be 
more responsive to local demands, the bewildering rate of 
change in the region only led to policy schizophrenia. 
Similarly, to the East, the EU failed to recognize how its soft 
expansion would provoke a response from Russia, who 
defended its competing narrative in the region with a force 
unthinkable several years ago.  
 
In essence, the benign expansions which had proved so 
successful in the US-led decades of liberal hegemony have 
met with the harsh reality of spheres of influence, power 
relations, and messy conflict. Now, with the realization that 
much of its neighbourhood is neither destined for nor 
desirous of the European way, the question of balancing 
values and interests becomes vital. Many call for Europe to 
take a more robust, realpolitik approach and prioritize first 
things first: stable states, energy security, and counter-
 
3 
Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
A Global Strategy for a Global Player? Shaping the EU’s Role in the World 
© D mhnall O’Sullivan 
 
CEPOB # 8.16 - April 2016 
 
extremism policies in the South; an end to ideological 
posturing over Ukraine and a pragmatic return to relations 
with Russia in the East.  
 
There is logic to these calls, especially in the short term. 
And to some degree, signs from Brussels indicate that the 
shift has already begun. Both the ‘strategic review’ 
prepared by the EEAS as well as the revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy of November 2015 place strong 
emphasis on the security of the neighbourhood, 
particularly to the South. Values such as human rights and 
democratic reform read almost as afterthoughts, while 
technocratic language has been eschewed for more 
forceful objectives. The EEAS even admits that all cards are 
on the table in ‘rethinking’ the Middle East, including 
dropping the ENP altogether. 
 
In the longer term, whether this shift in rhetoric will herald 
a shift in strategic action remains in question. History and 
institutional constraints mean that the EU is simply unable 
to act as a ‘classic’ geopolitical actor on the international 
stage; it lacks the military and political power. However, in 
maintaining an agile stance vis-à-vis all of the actual 
powers in the region, it can play a role in guiding and 
brokering strategic advantages. This means strategically 
coordinating the actions of its member states, who have 
capabilities and diplomatic ties throughout the 
neighbourhood. It also means ‘suspending’ some of its 
more idealist values in talking with the regional powers 
which really have an influence in the region: Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and Russia.  
 
Ultimately, it will mean a reset of the strategic vision of 
what the neighbourhood actually represents. The idea of 
the neighbourhood as on a benign road to Western-style 
reform is moribund, and any solutions will need to be both 
realistic and inclusive of all major local and regional 
powers. To the East, this will mean coming to terms with 
how Russia sees the region. To the South, the EU is well-
placed to facilitate broad dialogue around some sort of 
regional security architecture similar to the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Europe needs to 
reject the idea of the neighbourhood and move towards 
the rhetoric of a neighbourhood − a shared space where its 
sphere of influence overlaps with several others; where it 
may like to see its values extend but only when reciprocal 
interests of peace and security are confirmed. 
Global action − strategic or multilateral? 
 
Thirdly, the question of how the EU behaves itself in an 
increasingly competitive global environment is being 
explored. Various trends over the past decade have led to 
a dilution of the multilateral system espoused by the EU, 
and it must take stock accordingly. Shifts in relative 
economic power imply less global consensus around 
existing ‘Western-centric’ institutions; the increasing 
unwillingness of the US to act as ‘global policeman’ has 
removed some of the impetus for complying with a rules-
based system; and the manipulative use of economic tools 
as weapons, although not new, has led to ‘geo-economic’ 
power struggles. The net result is, presumably, what 
inspired the ‘more contested’ and ‘more complex’ sections 
of the EEAS assessment. 
 
Multilateral values in this context will be difficult to uphold. 
The EU may have to accept that sowing a seed requires 
fertile land, and currently the terrain is quite barren. As in 
the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 
‘success’ of normative expansion throughout preceding 
decades was arguably more influenced by external factors 
than by EU power as such: neighbouring states wanted 
access to the lucrative European market, while in the 
United Nations (UN) the EU could promote its brand of 
‘effective multilateralism’. This has changed, and until a 
significant level of reform is brought to the antiquated 
structures of bodies within the UN system and the 
International Monetary Fund, they will likely remain 
ineffective.  
 
This said, the EU could in theory be somewhat well 
equipped in the new environment. It remains the 
wealthiest and best educated region on the planet, giving 
it ample economic and trade clout. Its targeted use of 
sanctions in recent years, an internal coordination success, 
has been touted as a strategic model to build on in the 
future. And more in keeping with its own internal values of 
dialogue and consensus, its diplomatic links and 
capabilities are unrivalled. The 28 member states have 
many hundreds of embassies and missions around the 
globe; together with the coordination efforts of the 139 EU 
delegations and Europe’s historic global footprint, this 
represents an unparalleled level of presence and soft 
power capabilities. The standout success of recent years, 
diplomatic stewardship of the Iranian nuclear talks, built on 
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this and bodes well for future European involvement in 
sensitive regional dialogues. 
 
However, the EU may have to realize that one of its 
greatest advantages could also be its biggest stumbling 
block. The EEAS claims that the ‘specifically complex 
nature’ of the EU construction itself is a key added-value in 
navigating the complicated layers of governance in the 
modern world. This has indeed given the EU a valuable 
foundation in complex governance and consensus 
decision-making; and despite accusations of centralization, 
it seems almost ‘anti-fragile’ in its diffuse institutional 
structures. Yet, as business and individuals are increasingly 
discovering, the key traits of the 21st century are speed and 
agility, not cumbersome introspection. European history 
has bequeathed a valuable heritage of philosophical 
humility and consensus to its current generation; but its 
structures, particularly horizontal structures of 
cooperation between member states, the Commission and 
the EEAS, need to be leaner and more agile in order to react 
and best manoeuvre. 
 
Conclusion − compendium or constitution?  
 
A major challenge when drafting a foreign policy strategy 
is knowing when to stop. Unlike regional or thematic 
strategies dealing with specific challenges, the ambitious 
title of ‘Global Strategy’ naturally tends towards an 
assessment of every region, every threat, and every 
opportunity around the world. This tendency is even more 
pronounced for the EU, with interests and stakes in every 
corner of the planet. Add to this the multiplier effect of 
differing member state priorities and the risk could be to 
create a document which aggregates rather than distils, 
resulting in a long list of ‘priority’ regions and issues. Some 
saw this as the fundamental flaw in the ‘strategic 
partnership’ initiatives of the past decade; too many 
partners and not enough thought around what it meant to 
be strategic with them. 
 
On the other hand, falling into the trap of vague 
generalities is also a temptation. Member states have 
already signed up, in the Lisbon Treaty, to the core 
European values of democracy, freedom and respect for 
human rights. Even if some of these values are currently 
under threat within parts of the continent itself, any 
renewed call for them should be firmly anchored around 
clear external interests rather than listed simply as values 
in themselves. Similarly, every nation and most people are 
in favour of ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’; although they are 
useful foundations for such an exercise, they should not be 
the rhetorical lowest common denominator which 
supplants concrete objectives.  
 
Rather, the challenge is to be concise, clear, and concrete. 
In an era of more complexity, ‘the trick isn't adding stuff, 
it's taking it away’, according to Mark Zuckerberg. 
Strategies are in this sense simple − a clear enumeration of 
main goals, the principal means that will be used to get 
there, and a vision of the end state. Rather than a White 
Paper of priorities and processes, it should be a long-term 
and foundational vision of where the strategy should lead; 
a ‘foreign policy playbook’ which outlines what kind of 
power and role will be aspired to, and how it will be 
achieved. 
 
For various reasons, but most notably internal 
inconsistencies, this is a mammoth task for the EU. 
Differences between member states − particularly 
pronounced in 2016 − mean that it lacks a common 
understanding of what its core strategic objectives are in 
the world. And due to its institutional set up, it lacks the 
power and capabilities to force through and implement an 
executive version of what it believes its strategy should be. 
Yet these precise difficulties should not prevent a proactive 
and ambitious document. The very ‘invented’ nature of the 
EU construction should allow for a certain level of ambition 
and imagination in ‘inventing’ its role in the world, 
limitations notwithstanding.  
 
Progress and an extensive consultation process since the 
publication of the ‘strategic review’ seem to point in the 
right direction. The challenge is finally for the EEAS to find 
the common threads and put its own stamp on it; 
‘refin[ing] the art of orchestration of the polyphony of 
voices around the table and the panoply of instruments at 
our disposal’, as the review rather grandly concluded. In 
doing so, it should avoid getting dragged toward either 
extreme of day-to-day compendium or aspirational 
constitution in favour of clear policy guidelines outlining 
key interests: a stable but open neighbourhood, a fair but 
functioning multilateral system. Simply drafting the Global 
Strategy is already an intellectual and collaborative step 
forward; ensuring a tangible outcome is now paramount. 
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